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With the advent of Medicare prospective payment systems, health care entities and physicians were forced to decrease
expenses by sharing services and to increase revenue by attempting to jointly negotiate better reimbursement from third-
party payers. Both activities have raised the specter of prosecution under antitrust laws that have been with us for more
than a century but are poorly understood by practicing physicians. Recent monopolistic activities in the health care arena
have prompted the Federal Trade Commission to file actions under specific acts of Congress, eg, the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, Clayton Act, Federal Trade Commission Act, Robinson-Patman Act, and Celler-Kefauver Act. Inasmuch as it is likely
that specialties such as vascular surgery as a business will undergo substantial transformation, physicians need to be aware
of the severe civil and criminal sanctions imposed if they are found guilty; fines that are several times actual damages;
activities that raise antitrust issues including utilization review, medical staff privileges for competing specialties,
participating provider agreements, and predatory pricing; and affirmative defenses and relief available in terms of specific
exemptions.
As health care providers react, innovate, and adjust to stay solvent, their business strategies will surely continue to be
scrutinized for antitrust behavior by federal and state officials. The physician must have a basic understanding of the
groundrules that govern any contemplated business strategy so that common pitfalls may be averted. (J Vasc Surg 2003;
37:1334-40.)
The effect of changes in the health care system on
physician practices has been nothing short of cataclysmic.
Physicians have been slow to comprehend and adapt to new
laws and regulations that have great implications for their
financial future and their lifestyle. The public and the
legislature expect physicians to put patient health above all
else, with little regard for the cost necessary to manage the
illness. At the same time, they want physicians to operate
with efficiency and financial accountability similar to that
expected of other small businesses. Physicians find them-
selves in a quandary and have tried to emulate successful
business models by resorting to mergers, acquisitions, con-
solidations, network formation and by generally trying to
create a new health care delivery system. Joint contracting
with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and insur-
ers, merging to become a dominant provider of vascular
care in the local community, joint ventures with hospitals,
and participation in granting or rejecting hospital privileges
are activities that are part of medical practice today. These
actions also attract the attention of state and federal regu-
lators charged with enforcing laws that encourage compe-
tition and deter antitrust activities. It behooves the physi-
cian to have some knowledge of antitrust laws so that
career-ending mistakes are averted and legal advice is ob-
tained at the earliest opportune time.
This is a review of common antitrust instruments avail-
able to law enforcement, eg, the Sherman Act, Clayton Act,
and Federal Trade Commission Act (Table). Implications
for health care professionals, immunity against antitrust
laws, standards for violations, and defense against such laws
are also discussed. This review is not meant to be exhaustive
or to substitute for expert legal advice.
SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT
Prior to the nineteenth century, governments typically
granted monopoly rights over some portion of the econ-
omy in return for cash payment. In England this practice
was stopped by Parliament with its famous 1624 Statute of
Monopolies, which took away the power of the Crown to
grant monopolies.1 In the nineteenth century “big busi-
ness” in the form of mass transportation (railroads) and
mass communication (telegraph) arrived and led to com-
petition.2 Monopolization by large businesses such as the
Standard Oil Company led to public sentiment against
mergers, trusts, and holding companies that stifled compe-
tition. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act was passed by a 51 to 1
vote in the Senate on April 8, 1890, and by a unanimous
vote of 242 to 0 by the House of Representatives on June
20, 1890. The bill was signed into law by President Ben-
jamin Harrison on July 2, 1890.1 Interpretation of this
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legislation has changed over the years, along with enforce-
ment, and greatly depends on changing political winds.
Most litigation in this area has focused on either Section 1
or Section 2 (or both) of the Act.
Section 1. “Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any
other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceed-
ing 3 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.”3
To have a conspiracy, combination, or agreement there
must be joint activity between two or more persons or legal
entities (under Section 7, “person or persons” includes
corporations and associations).4 A corporation or a subsid-
iary cannot legally conspire with its own employees, depart-
ments, or divisions. Restraint of trade is often alleged in
instances in which hospital-based physicians such as anes-
thesiologists or radiologists are denied privileges in a health
care institution, on the basis of an exclusive contract by
hospital administration with another group. Restraint of
trade can be horizontal (competitors at the same level in a
market conspire to fix prices, divide markets, or exclude
others) or vertical (two entities at different levels act to-
gether to do the same).
Section 2. “Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 3 years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.”3
This section deals with businesses who singly or com-
bine with others to monopolize or attempt to monopolize
a market. The courts attempt to address three issues before
determining whether there has been a violation of this
section. First, the Court must determine the relevant geo-
graphic referral area in question. A typical example would
be if a health care organization agreed to acquire a major
competitor in the same city. To counter a charge of mo-
nopolization, the organization would likely present the
combined market share of the new entity by zip code and
compare it with all hospitals in its referral area, in and
outside the county, not just in the local metropolitan area.
Next it must decide whether the defendants controlled
prices or excluded competitors. Finally, the Court must
have evidence that the monopoly power was obtained or
maintained willfully. In general terms, monopolization “re-
quires that the defendant dominate the relevant market.”5
As a practical matter, monopoly power is measured by the
alleged monopolist’s share of the relevant market. Absolute
monopoly in the economic sense (100% of the market) is a
rare phenomenon. The question frequently asked is, How
large a share must a firm possess to come within the
statutory concept? Although factors such as “concentration
of market, high barriers to entry, consumer demand,
strength of the competition, or consolidation trend in the
market”5 may lower the threshold, any market share of 50%
or higher is sufficient to be of concern. The next question
the Court addresses is, Was the monopoly power deliber-
ately acquired or maintained? Monopoly power achieved
through growth or development as a consequence of a
better product or business skills is acceptable. Conscious
acts such as unreasonably low pricing designed to maintain
Table I. Comparison of three major antitrust acts
Sherman Act Clayton Act Federal Trade Commission Act
Year enacted 1890 1914 1914
Right of action Private, DOJ Private, DOJ FTC only
Enforcer DOJ, FTC DOJ, FTC FTC
Jurisdiction For-profit, not-for-profit hospitals For-profit, not-for-profit hospitals For-profit, not-for-profit hospitals
Sections relating to
monopolies
Section 2 Section 7 Section 5
Sections relating to tying
and contracts of service
Section 1 Section 3
Penalties Criminal, civil Civil Civil
Criminal Felony, fine and/or
imprisonment, or both
None None
Maximum fine, Individuals:
$350,000 term3 y per offense
Corporations: Maximum fine, $10
million per offense
Civil Injunction to cease activity Injunction to cease activity Injunction to cease activity
Failure to do so: daily fine, $10,000 Failure to do so: daily fine, $10,000 Failure to do so: daily fine, $10,000
Private parties can seek
injunction, collect triple actual
damages and attorney fees
Private parties can seek
injunction, collect triple actual
damages and attorney fees
Private parties can seek
injunction, collect triple actual
damages and attorney fees
DOI, Department of Justice; FTC, Federal Trade Commission.
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a monopoly would attract regulators. Litigation under the
Sherman Act is usually resolved by using either “per se”
analysis or “rule of reason” analysis.4 Some agreements, eg,
price fixing or market allocation, are so obviously anticom-
petitive that the actions are illegal per se without the need
to gauge any harm the agreement may or may not have
caused. Other joint agreements, eg, hospital or medical
group mergers and hospital or physician joint ventures, are
designed to increase efficiency or quality or to decrease
cost. The courts review individual cases under a rule of
reason, in which market area, pricing, and quality of care
data are all analyzed before reaching a decision. This fol-
lows a Supreme Court ruling in 1911 that, despite the
statutory language, the Sherman Act applied to only those
trade restraints that are unreasonable. This rule of reason
has since been a feature of judicial interpretation of the
antitrust laws. Combined action by two or more entities is
much more likely to be treated to a stricter interpretation of
these rules than is a unilateral action, because of the poten-
tial for anticompetitive behavior.
The Sherman Act differentiates between a combined
and a solitary act. Congress intended the marketplace to
allow a business to capture more market share by being
more efficient and capture unhappy customers (or pa-
tients), because this promotes competition. Section 2 gov-
erns the conduct of a single business (or practice), and any
action is only unlawful when there is evidence of actual or
impending monopolization. On the other hand, Section 1
allows a much more stricter view of any collective action
than a solitary act under Section 2, because the collective
action is inherently anticompetitive.
CLAYTON ACT
To further clarify the general language in the Sherman
Act, Congress in 1914 passed the Clayton Act to specifically
address price discrimination, tying contracts and corporate
expansion.
Section 2 (a): Price discrimination. Section 2 (a),
amended in 1926 by the Robinson-Patman Act, applies to
sale of commodities and, of importance, to sellers who
practice discriminatory pricing and to buyers who derive
benefits from such policies. Discriminatory pricing may also
violate the Sherman Act, if done to monopolize a market.
In a 1976 case the Supreme Court allowed pharmaceutical
manufacturers to sell products to not-for-profit hospitals at
a lower price than to commercial pharmacies as long as
those products were purchased for their own use.6 Prescrip-
tion refills to former patients and sales to nonemergent
buyers were not exempted. This ruling in effect prompted
not-for-profit hospitals to cease drug sales to the general
public on an outpatient basis. This section does not pro-
hibit price setting in response to the competition’s pricing,
but merely prevents an entity from trying to rout the
competition.
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The Robinson-Patman Act was passed to prevent mo-
nopolies and to lessen competition by prohibiting price
discrimination “between different purchasers of commod-
ities of like grade and quality.” Congress exempted, among
others, not-for-profit institutions that purchase supplies for
their own use. For-profit entities must show that any price
differential occurred to counter competition or that it will
lead to cost efficiencies in the manufacturing or sale of
goods.
Section 3: Tying. Section 3 prohibits “tying” sale or
leasing of various products (not services) to demanding
that the purchasers not use or deal with a competitor. An
example of a tying arrangement is an ultrasound manufac-
turer that exploits its control over a unique piece of equip-
ment that it wishes to sell and forces a hospital to buy a
product it either does not want or could purchase elsewhere
at a better price.
Section 7: Corporate mergers and acquisitions.
Mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions are addressed in
Section 7, which addresses monopolization in the same way
as Section 2 of the Sherman Act. As modified by the
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, Congress intended to pro-
hibit monopolization and suppression of competition by
any act such as a merger. A common example today would
be a joint venture between a physician group and a health
care organization, eg, an outpatient surgery center. Under
Section 7, a potential plaintiff contesting the venture as
substantially lessening competition would have the burden
of proof in demonstrating an anticompetitive effect.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
In 1914 Congress established the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) and empowered it to enforce antitrust stat-
utes and to monitor and regulate any “unfair or deceptive”
trade practices.7 The pharmaceutical industry has been on
the receiving end of many cases in which the FTC has
charged companies with false or misleading advertising
unsupported by facts.
A common source of frustration for physicians is the
aggressive policing of physician practices for antitrust activ-
ity in contrast to the health insurance conglomerates, which
are to a certain extent immune from prosecution for similar
behavior. Congress has granted immunity from antitrust
legislation under five specific circumstances. One of these is
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which excuses the insurance
industry under certain circumstances from antitrust legisla-
tions.8 In 1924 Congress exempted the “business of insur-
ance” from this burden unless their conduct was deemed to
be a “boycott, coercion or intimidation.”9 Most, if not all,
physicians would strongly argue that the health insurance
industry’s conduct has met or exceeded this threshold! In
fact, the FTC has a newly formed “merger litigation task
force” that will look into how health care prices have been
affected by hospital mergers. This task force will employ 20
lawyers and focus more on existing mergers than on pro-
posed mergers and trying to predict the future. The FTC
last challenged a Michigan merger in 1996, and lost on
appeal.10 FTC Chairman Timothy Muris has “vowed con-
tinued vigilance” and said the commission “continues to
see a wide variety of overt anticompetitive behavior in
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health care, along with some new variants.”11 He boasted
that the agency had recently reached a settlement with a
1200-member physician group in Texas for alleged price
fixing.
Another front that the physician community has ex-
plored is for collective bargaining rights granted by individ-
ual state legislatures. This approach was taken in response
to a “take it or leave it” attitude commonly exhibited by
payers. The FTC, with encouragement from state health
plan associations, has also stepped in with opinions claim-
ing that these rights would constitute price fixing.12
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The US Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3)
gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with “for-
eign nations and among the several states,” but intrastate
activities are excluded from federal authority. For this rea-
son, until 1976 medical practices and hospital operations
were thought to be “intrastate” activities and therefore not
subject to federal antitrust laws.4 This all changed with the
US Supreme Court ruling in Hospital Building Co v Trust-
ees of the Rex Hospital.13 Hospital Building Company was
a for-profit corporation that owned and operated Mary
Elizabeth Hospital, a 49-bed hospital in Raleigh, NC. The
company wished to expand to 140 beds and relocate within
the city of Raleigh. The plaintiff alleged that the trustees,
the administrator, and the local agency conspired to delay,
obstruct, and possibly prevent state authorization of the
company’s plans. Their basis for alleging violation of Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act was that almost 80% of its
medicines and a substantial number of patients were from
outside the state, that a large percentage of its revenues
were from out of state insurance companies, and that the
expansion plans were largely being funded by out-of-state
lenders. The Court found the hospital, trustees, adminis-
trators, and others subject to the Sherman Act. The Court
agreed with plaintiff that inasmuch as some of the hospital
revenue, patients, medicines, and supplies were related to
out-of-state sources, the defendant’s actions had a “sub-
stantial” effect on interstate commerce and therefore it was
liable under the Sherman Act. The effect of this ruling on
the health care industry, specifically relating to medical staff
privileges, is still not clear. Generally an entity’s conduct has
to have a substantial influence on interstate commerce.
Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting requirements. The
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires certain types of mergers
and consolidations to be reported to the FTC or the
Department of Justice (DOJ) before the transaction has
taken place.9 This requirement applies more to larger insti-
tutions than to physician groups. One of the criteria is that
the acquiring party have total assets or annual net sales of
more than $100 million and that the acquired party have
total assets or annual net sales of more than $10 million, or
vice versa. As a practical matter, less than 4% of approxi-
mately 397 complaints received by the DOJ and the FTC
between 1981 and 1993 resulted in a court challenge or
consent decree.14 These complaints mostly involved acute
care hospital mergers, and were usually dismissed after
preliminary investigation.
IMMUNITY AGAINST ANTITRUST
LEGISLATION
Several situations are exempted from these statutes.
The courts have created exemptions by implied repeal, state
action, and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.4 Implied re-
peal is invoked when antitrust legislation is in direct conflict
with existing federal statutes. Occasionally the state itself
promulgates a policy or regulation that may not be in
compliance with federal antitrust legislation. In this in-
stance, the courts have ruled that the state action, under
clearly enunciated rules, takes precedence.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine exempts activities re-
lated to influencing legislation by invoking the First
Amendment of the Constitution, which guarantees free-
dom of speech and the right to petition the government.
Congress created a fourth exemption when it passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which excuses the insurance in-
dustry under certain circumstances from antitrust legisla-
tion.8 The fifth exemption is for union and business–
negotiated collective bargaining agreements.
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONALS
Until 1975 (Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar Associa-
tion)15 it was believed that the Sherman Act applied only to
trade and commerce and not to professions. In that case,
the Supreme Court opined that a minimum fee schedule set
by the local bar association was illegal under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. The US Supreme Court, in other cases
involving engineers and dentists, ruled that antitrust laws
do apply to “learned professions.” Some specific actions
may subject physicians to charges of violating antitrust laws.
Merger of practices. Under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, all mergers, acquisi-
tions, and consolidations can be challenged. Under Section
1 of the Sherman Act, plaintiff must establish the presence
of an agreement or conspiracy between two or more per-
sons, with intent to harm or unreasonably restrain compe-
tition, and finally causation of injury to the competition
beyond effect on plaintiff. Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, even a unilateral action resulting in a monopoly or an
attempt at a monopoly puts a medical practice at risk for
prosecution. A merger resulting in a large practice that
controls a large referral area by itself is not evidence of a
monopoly. Plaintiff must establish that a practice has the
market power to fix or control prices, that it controls
enough of the geographic market, and that it has achieved
or maintained the monopoly “willfully” or “unfairly.”16 A
successful business as a result of efficiency, superior prod-
uct, or technologic growth does not represent a violation of
antitrust principles (ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp v Inter-
national Business Machines Corp, 1978).17 Because the
Sherman Act is much harder to enforce, prosecutors have
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used Section 7 of the Clayton Act to try to control creation
of monopolies.
Sharing services through joint agreements. Several
physician groups may collectively agree to have a joint
purchasing agreement for data processing, medical sup-
plies, communication technology, printing needs, labora-
tory services, and medical transcription. This purchasing
entity would not be exempt from the Robinson-Patman
Act. Therefore the joint entity may not engage in “price
discrimination” if the result is a monopoly or lessened
competition.
18
However, if the price discount leads to a
savings by decreasing delivery costs and the arrangement
was arrived at in good faith to decrease overhead and
counter genuine competition, sharing agreements may not
be challenged.
Physician role in utilization review within health
care institutions. Even though the McCarran-Ferguson
Act does not exempt utilization review from antitrust
charges anymore, a properly executed utilization review
program can protect the physician and the institution from
challenges. In a nongovernment setting, provided the pro-
gram does not suppress competition, promote a certain
behavior under duress, or limit the role of practicing phy-
sicians to that of an advisory role, it will likely survive
antitrust challenges.19,20
Liability for institutional activity in granting staff
privileges. A common legal action is that initiated by
physicians who are denied medical staff appointments be-
cause the institution has an exclusive contract with an
existing group, usually a hospital- based physician group
such as anesthesiologists. Since 1982 a series of court
decisions21 have upheld these contracts as reasonable and
not violating the Sherman Act. Although the courts have
given hospital boards some leeway in receiving advice from
its medical staff, any decision by the physicians on a creden-
tialing committee must not be seen as intending to lessen
competition. This Act has allowed allied health profession-
als (eg, podiatrists, nurse practitioners, psychologists) to
obtain privileges in hospitals on the basis of individual
training, experience, and competence.
Participating physician agreements. In general, par-
ticipating provider agreements, ban on “balance billing,”
and denying nonparticipating physician payment for ser-
vices have survived challenges based on the theory of price
fixing and an illegal monopoly. No antitrust violation has
been deemed to occur in the absence of any horizontal or
vertical price fixing and barring control of reimbursement
contracts by a group of competing physicians. In 1982
(Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society)22 the US
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit changed the entire
landscape. The Maricopa Foundation was established in
1969 as a nonprofit Arizona corporation to promote a
fee-for-service alternative to existing insurance plans. It
represented about 1750 allopathic and osteopathic physi-
cians and podiatrists, comprising almost 70% of practitio-
ners in Maricopa County. The State of Arizona did not
challenge two of the Foundation’s activities: peer review
and claim administration. The legal challenge was about
the Foundation establishing a maximum fee schedule,
based on relative values and conversion factors, that its
members could charge patients covered under insurance
plans approved by the Foundation. The Foundation argued
that their actions were pro-competitive, imposed a limit on
fees, saved insurers money, and helped stabilize health care
costs. They also argued that the per se rule did not apply to
this case because the arrangement was horizontal, fixed
maximum prices, was among members of a profession, and
the judiciary had little antitrust experience with the health
care industry. The State contended that the Foundation’s
actions resulted in upward revision of fees and increased
premiums. The Court found the medical group of physi-
cians guilty of violation of the per se rule regardless of
whether the arrangement was pro-competitive and of price
fixing because they had jointly established a maximum fee
schedule for reimbursement from a third-party payer. Since
that decision many individual practice associations (IPAs)
have been formed that are true joint ventures that share
capital risk in operating an organization that negotiates
with payers. However, some IPAs do not involve significant
capital risk but simply have an initial contribution for legal
and other fees for setting up the organization. These IPAs,
even though not included under one of the “safety zones,”
are not illegal and are looked at under rule of reason
analysis. If sharing fee information is necessary and subor-
dinate to attaining efficiencies in care, the DOJ is not likely
to question the arrangement. Of importance, physicians in
these groups must be free to negotiate and contract with
other payers and treat other patients outside the IPA.
Joint ventures. A physician network joint venture is a
physician-controlled venture in which the network physi-
cian participants collectively agree on prices or price-related
terms and jointly market their services.23 These joint ven-
tures may be “exclusive” or “nonexclusive.” Exclusive plans
prohibit the physicians, in general, from contracting with
other networks or plans, whereas nonexclusive plans allow
such outside contracting. The DOJ will not challenge,
absent extraordinary circumstances, an exclusive physician
network joint venture in which physician participants share
substantial financial risk and constitute 20% or less of the
physicians in each physician specialty with active hospital
staff privileges who practice in the relevant geographic
market. Similarly, the DOJ will not ordinarily challenge a
nonexclusive physician network joint venture in which phy-
sician participants share substantial financial risk and con-
stitute 30% or less of the physicians in each physician
specialty with active hospital staff privileges who practice in
the relevant geographic market. The safety zones outlined
by the DOJ are limited to networks involving substantial
financial risk sharing, “not because such risk sharing is a
desired end in itself, but because it normally is a clear and
reliable indicator that a physician network involves suffi-
cient integration by its physician participants to achieve
significant efficiencies.”23 The DOJ argues that risk sharing
provides incentives for physicians to cooperate in control-
ling costs and improving quality by managing provision of
services by network physicians. The following list includes
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examples of collective actions by physicians that are not
likely to be challenged by the FTC or the DOJ.
1. A local medical society’s collection of outcome data
from its members about a particular procedure or treat-
ment, eg, a new arterial graft, they believe should be
covered by a purchaser and the provision of such infor-
mation to the purchaser.19 Physicians may collectively
engage in discussions with purchasers or insurers about
the scientific merit of graft patency data. However, the
antitrust safety zone excludes any attempt by physicians
to intimidate or influence a purchaser’s decision by
implying or threatening boycott of any plan that is not
to the liking of the physician group. For example, if
physician groups collectively refuse to provide test re-
sults or arteriograms to an insurer to prevent the insurer
from making a decision regarding coverage of a proce-
dure, antitrust violation is likely.
2. Standards or protocols for patient management devel-
oped to assist physicians in clinical decision-making,
which also may provide useful information to patients,
other health care professionals, and purchasers.
3. Surveys to determine salaries, wages, and prices in a
particular health care field, provided that the survey is
performed by a third party; the data provided by respon-
dents are more than 3 months old; and at least five
physicians report data on which each disseminated sta-
tistic is based, no individual physician’s data may repre-
sent more than 25% on a weighted basis of that statistic,
and any information disseminated must be sufficiently
aggregated that it would not allow recipients to identify
prices charged by any individual physician.19
4. An area of possible anticompetitive behavior involves
the risk of “spillover” effects from the joint venture. For
example, physicians in the venture may use sensitive
shared pricing information to their individual benefit
outside the joint venture to stifle competition. The
group can avert scrutiny by hiring an independent third
party to collect and analyze such sensitive information
and subsequently present the aggregate results to the
group.
STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING ANTITRUST
VIOLATIONS
Inasmuch as all business contracts potentially can be
seen as anti-competitive because they involve two or more
persons, the courts have applied either a rule of reason or a
per se standard to reach a decision. The rule of reason is the
common approach, especially in health care litigation,
wherein the court analyzes each case individually. The
court looks at all negative and positive factors that have any
bearing on anti-competitive activity, eg, geographic mar-
kets, nature of the industry, and effects of alleged anticom-
petitive activity on the market. This process is time-con-
suming. In some instances, the defendant’s behavior is so
egregious that full analysis of the facts is not warranted and
the activity is deemed illegal per se. These activities may
include price fixing, tying agreements, organized boycotts,
and division and allocation of markets so as to stifle com-
petition.
DEFENSE AGAINST ANTITRUST
ALLEGATIONS
Safety zones. The DOJ and the FTC in 1996 released
a “statement of antitrust enforcement policy in health care”
that established nine safety zones.23 These agencies will not
use antitrust statutes to challenge conduct by health care
entities if it falls within one of these zones. Some of these
safety zones relevant to physician practices include joint
purchasing agreements; exclusive and nonexclusive physi-
cian network joint ventures; surveys that include salaries,
benefits, and prices; joint ventures to provide specialized
services and expensive high-technology equipment; and
multiple provider networks. Multiple provider networks are
likely to be looked on favorably if they benefit health care
consumers by promoting efficiency, even though they in-
clude pricing agreements.
“Weak competitor” defense4. A health care entity
may argue that acquiring a weak company on the verge of
failing will not lessen competition in the market. There
must be objective evidence of inadequate resources avail-
able to the failing entity or impending bankruptcy for the
government or courts to review.
Purchase of stock4. The Clayton Act does not theo-
retically apply if an entity purchases another for the sole
purpose of acquiring stock in it for investment purposes.
That stock then may not be used for competitive purposes.
The reality in most instances is that most purchases of
health care entities are not solely for investing purposes.
It is important to note that antitrust laws protect the
competition, not the competitor.24 Plaintiff is required to
prove that the injury is attributable to anti-competitive
behavior and not just a casual relation to antitrust violation.
The usual defense is factual evidence repudiating allega-
tions of anti-competitive behavior. This includes any effi-
ciency gained, achievement of economies of scale, and a
favorable assessment of the geographic referral area. In
1982 the DOJ used the Herfindhahl-Herschman Index
(HHI),24 which is calculated by summing the squares of
the market share percentages of each firm in the market.
Depending on the HHI after the acquisition, markets are
categorized as unconcentrated, moderately concentrated,
or highly concentrated. In moderately and highly concen-
trated markets particular increases in the HHI as a result of
the acquisition are said to raise a presumption of anti-
competitive effect. Such allegation can be refuted by evi-
dence demonstrating that the merger is unlikely to create
opportunities for competition to raise prices. Competing
physician groups who are considering jointly providing
non-fee-related or fee-related information to a purchaser or
insurer and are uncertain whether their conduct violates
antitrust laws can request from the DOJ an expedited
business review procedure, announced on December 1,
1992 (58 Fed Reg 6132 [1993]) or the FTC advisory
opinion procedure contained at 16 C.F.R. 1.1-1.4
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(1993).19 The agencies will usually respond within 90 days
after all necessary information is submitted.
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